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Corporate Management, Labour Relations and Community Building at The East India 




This essay offers a social history of the labour relations established by the 
English East India Company at its Blackwall Dockyard in East London from 
1615-1645. It uses all of the relevant evidence from the Company’s minute 
books, printed bye-laws, and petitions to the Company to assemble a full account 
of the relationships formed between skilled and unskilled workers, managers, 
and company officials. Challenging other historians’ depictions of early modern 
dockyards as sites for class confrontation, this essay offers a more agile account 
of the hierarchies within the yard to suggest how and why the workforce used 
its considerable power to challenge management and when and why it was 
successful in doing so. Overall, the essay suggests that the East India Company 
developed and prioritised a broader social constituency around the dockyard 
over particular labour lobbies to pre-empt accusations that it abdicated its social 
responsibilities. In this way, the company reconciled the competing interests of 
profit (as a joint stock company with investors) and social responsibility by - to 
some extent - assuming the social role of its progenitor organisations – the 
Livery Company and the borough corporation.  
 
Early modern trading corporations were social institutions as well as commercial ones. As large 
employers, both at home and overseas, they sought to maintain positive labour relations with 
management practices that were responsive, adaptive and positioned the company as an integral 
and beneficial component of local communities. In doing so they were able to make the case 
for their corporate privileges with reference to the employment opportunities they provided 
and their positive contribution to society. Whereas social history has long invigorated the study 
of the early modern period, modern capitalist ideologies have sometimes distracted attention 
away from the ways in which one of the early modern period’s signature institutions – the 
corporation – served and upheld social agendas.1 But, in ignoring the social activities of the 
early modern trading corporation, the history of international capitalism itself remains 
incomplete. Positioning the corporation as an arbiter of orderly, stable social relations offers 
numerous avenues for re-assessing their relationships to early modern communities and states. 
This essay focusses on the English East India Company (EIC)’s Blackwall Dockyard 
(immediately to the east of the City of London on the northern banks of the Thames) to 
illuminate the ways in which the Company intermediated with its workers at the docks during 
                                                          
1 For examples of this tendency see K.N. Chaudhuri, The English East India Company: The Study of an Early 
Joint-Stock Company, 1600-1640 (London, 1965) and K.G. Davies, The Royal African Company (London, 
1957). Other forms of corporate activity, such as urban corporations and livery companies, have received more 
attention from social historians, but rarely in reference to labour. See Phil Withington, The Politics of 
Commonwealth: Citizens and Freemen in Early Modern England (Cambridge, 2005) and George Unwin, The 
Gilds and Companies of London (London, 1938). Andrew Gamble and Gavin Kelly “The Politics of the 
Company”, in John Parkinson, Andrew Gamble, and Gavin Kelly (eds), The Political Economy of the Company 
(Oxford, 2000), p. 27. 
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the company’s very early history.2 At Blackwall the EIC employed one of London’s largest 
labour forces to build and maintain the shipping required for its extensive overseas activities.3 
In managing this facility, the EIC was morally obliged and strategically inclined to assume a 
role in the community and uphold the social expectations of two of its precursor institutions – 
the livery company and the borough corporation. These bodies had, for centuries, nurtured their 
local economies, infrastructures, and the availability, health, and quality of the labour force. 
This essay surveys how the EIC managed this at Blackwall and the adjoining community of 
Poplar. In doing so, the essay suggests ways in which corporate history offers new directions 
for histories of labour, corporations and empire. 
This essay places the internal social dynamics of these sites of social contest – the early 
modern dockyard – into their large social hinterlands and the deeply ingrained cultures that 
structured commercial and industrial activity. Operating in a period where social stability was 
ensured in part through government industrial regulations ‘whose primary aim was the 
continuity of employment’, the EIC was part of a corporate world where ensuring good 
relations with workers was a key aspect of their institutional purpose.4 London’s history is, 
according to Mark Jenner and Paul Griffiths ‘a history of the social relations and social 
practices of its inhabitants’ and of the multiplicity of overlapping communities, interests and 
activities that made up the city.5  The role of parishes in policing these new communities was 
essential, and the officers charged with maintaining order were drawn from the neighbourhoods 
they oversaw.6 London’s Livery Companies provided some means of controlling and managing 
the workforce in the early modern city. They operated by ‘providing a framework within which 
the conditions of employment could be regulated, standards of production maintained, and 
legislations for the benefit of the craft promoted’.7 In addition to ensuring standards through 
the rigorous demands of apprenticeship and the role of masters, livery companies also 
maintained powers to inspect and search the property of members to ensure their quality of 
work.8 When the EIC – as a body both partly based upon and whose members were immersed 
within – the Livery and the Corporation of London itself – decided to build its dockyard beyond 
the City walls, they likely expected to free themselves from some of these regulations, but they 
quickly sought to replicate the protections of the regulated urban environment in the enlarged 
                                                          
2 The history of the Blackwall dockyard has long been of interest to historians of London, of shipbuilding, and 
the docks. See Hermione Hobhouse (ed.), Survey of London: Poplar, Blackwall, and the Isle of Dogs, the Parish 
of All Saints, vols. 43 and 44 (London, 1999); Sir William Foster, John Company (London, 1926). 
3 The Company’s other large labour force, its sailors, has gained some attention from social historians. See Cheryl 
Fury (ed.), The Social History of English Seamen, 1485-1649 (Woodbridge, 2012); Idem, “Good Wills Hunting’: 
Tracking down the men of the first East India Company voyage, 1601-1603’ in International Journal of Maritime 
History, 27, 3 (2015), pp. 506-527. 
4 B. E. Supple, Commercial Crisis and Change in England, 1600-1642: A Study in the Instability of a Mercantile 
Economy (Cambridge, 1964), p. 245-6. 
5 Mark S. R. Jenner and Paul Griffiths, ‘Introduction’ in Paul Griffiths and Mark S. R. Jenner (eds.), Londinopolis: 
Essays in the cultural and social history of early modern London (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 
2000), pp. 8-9.  
6 Jenner and Griffiths, Londinopolis, pp. 292-303. 
7 Ian Archer, The Pursuit of Stability: Social relations in Elizabethan London (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1991), p. 100. 
8 Joseph P. Ward, Metropolitan Communities: Trade guilds, identity, and change in early modern London 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997), pp. 29-39; Maarten Prak, Catharina Lis, Jan Lucassen and Hugo Soly 
(eds), Craft Guilds in the Early Modern Low Countries: work, power and representation (Aldershot, 2006). 
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communities around the dockyard as a means to ensure a good supply of local labour.9 The 
company’s attempt to develop their workforce in a context where it would undertake the 
stabilising and monitoring roles of parish and guild depended upon forging a new community 
of labour around the docks who would maintain some loyalty to the company.10 
While deriving much of their institutional structure and their practices from these 
institutional progenitors, corporations like the EIC added joint stock financing to this 
institutional mix, enabling the purchasing power of huge workforces on a scale not seen in 
European cities.11 But this increases in size also simultaneously created a collective bargaining 
power for the labour force. How did early modern trading corporations reconcile this paradox? 
How did they satisfy the social imperatives of their guild-like predecessors by taking care of 
their labour forces at the same time as controlling labour costs so as not to disappoint investors? 
Did they use scale to control costs? Or were the skills of their shipwrights and mariners scarce 
enough for labour power to form and dictate corporate policy to company directors?12 This 
focus on the ways in which the Blackwall dockyard shows the EIC as a community builder in 
London (rather than in India) offers a useful new perspective for corporate and company 
history.13 Company histories have not ignored the social bases of their operations. They have 
often highlighted the importance of labour to the self-justifications of corporations, but have 
rarely connected this posturing to the company’s management of their own labour force.14 
Others noted the ways in which corporations concentrated local labour forces but remained 
uninterested in the ways in which this concentration facilitated the creation of labour power 
that could influence the corporation itself.15 Historians of the EIC who have mentioned this 
important experiment in local infrastructure building have usually characterised the Blackwall 
dockyard as a commercial folly – judging the yard solely against financial criteria.16 
Early modern dockyards have long been of interest to labour and social historians. As 
‘the only sizeable industrial centres in most European states’ sites like the Venice Arsenal 
(which covered over sixty acres and employed up to two thousand men) created unique 
                                                          
9 For the development of other industrial communities outside London, see David Levine and Keith Wrightson, 
The Making of an Industrial Society: Whickham, 1560-1765 (Oxford, 1991).  
10 The ‘all-encompassing presence’ on the Company in this wider community effected more than its workers 
alone, but also their families, friends and neighbours. See, Pamela Sharpe, ‘Gender at Sea: Women and the East 
India Company in Seventeenth-Century London’ in Penelope Lane, Neil Raven and K. D. M. Snell, Women, Work 
and Wages in England, 1600-1850 (Woodbridge, 2004).  
11As Jan de Vries and Ad van der Woude have demonstrated the Dutch East India Company (VOC) employed 
4,500 people in Asia and 3,200 on board its ships in 1625. As such ‘the VOC was by far the largest single 
employer in the Republic’. Jan De Vries and Ad van der Woude, The First Modern Economy: Success, Failure, 
and Perseverance of the Dutch Economy, 1500-1815 (Cambridge, 1997), p. 462. The VOC had considerable 
support from the state in regards to its military development. See, Jan Piet Puype, The Arsenal of the World: The 
Dutch Arms Trade in the Seventeenth Century (Amsterdam, 1996). 
12 For convenience we use the anachronistic term ‘director’ to describe the members of the Court of Committees.  
13 Philip J. Stern, The Company-State: Corporate Sovereignty and the Early Modern Foundations for the British 
Empire in India (Oxford, 2011). 
14 Ted McCormick, “Population: Modes of Seventeenth Century Demographic Thought” in Philip Stern and 
Carl Wennerlind (eds), Mercantilism Reimagined: Political Economy in Early Modern Britain and its Empire 
(New York, 2014), p. 29. For the use of the poor as a labour resource see also Joyce Appleby, Economic 
Thought and Ideology in Seventeenth Century England (Princeton, 1978) 
15 Matthew David Mitchell “Three English Cloth Towns and the Royal African Company”, The Journal of The 
Historical Society, XIII (2013). 
16 Chaudhuri, English East India Company, pp. 89-108. 
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problems of planning, coordination, and costing. 17 For Pepijn Brandon, the historian of the 
Dutch naval docks, shipyards were ‘the laboratories for historians of modernisation processes, 
the evolution of administrative cultures, and the development of capitalist relations’.18 
Historians of these yards have focussed on what they can tell us about the state as a largescale 
employer. 19 Labour historians have also concentrated on the ways in which mass employment 
within them assisted the development of ‘thoroughly self-conscious … worker group[s] with 
traditions, privileges and status in the larger society’.20 They have therefore preferred to 
document social hierarchy within these industrial communities.21 Such studies of social 
stratification have also focussed on tensions within these groups. The scale of these operations 
encouraged workers to turn to strikes and disruption as a means to negotiate more favourable 
working conditions and wages. But this focus on tensions between state employers and workers 
has often projected back onto authors who have either bemoaned prior historians depiction of 
‘dockyardmen’ as deferential or have presumed that workers were persistently and inherently 
oppositional to their bosses.22 As Roger Morriss has explained, dockyards were deeply 
embedded in their wider communities and ‘were shaped by more than immediate issues’ with 
managers ‘influenced by prevailing attitudes in government towards their employees’ just as 
‘artificers and labourers were influenced by feelings in the local community towards 
government’.23 Using the history of the EIC dockyard at Blackwall, this essay challenges some 
of these depictions. It offers a more supple and nuanced depiction of the hierarchies at work 
within the dockyards. This depiction offers more room for the realisation of shared goals and 
compromises within the labour negotiations that emerged between skilled and unskilled 
workers, their representatives, managers, and the leaders of the company itself. Agendas and 
outcomes were not simply paternalist and oppressive or militant and liberating. Relations 
between workers and employers ought not to be characterised as trapped in a permanent class 
confrontation.  
                                                          
17 Robert C. Davis, Shipbuilders of the Venetian Arsenal: Workers and workplace in the preindustrial city 
(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991), p. 7, pp. 3-4 
18 Pepijn Brandon, War, Capital, and the Dutch State (1588-1795) (Leiden: Brill, 2015), p. 139 and Kenneth Lunn 
and Ann Day, ‘Introduction’ in Kenneth Lunn and Ann Day (eds.), History of Work and Labour Relations in the 
Royal Dockyards (London: Mansell, 1999), p. xi. 
19 Kenneth Lunn and Ann Day, ‘Introduction’ in Kenneth Lunn and Ann Day (eds.), History of Work and Labour 
Relations in the Royal Dockyards (London: Mansell, 1999), p. xi. p. xii. 
20 Robert C. Davis, Shipbuilders of the Venetian Arsenal: Workers and workplace in the preindustrial city 
(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991), p. 6. 
21 Ibid., pp. 10-11. 
22 See Brandon. For a more nuanced view see Davis.  
22 Robert C. Davis, Shipbuilders of the Venetian Arsenal: Workers and workplace in the preindustrial city 
(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991), p. 6 and pp. 54-9 and Roger Knight, ‘From Impressment 
to Task Work: Strikes and disruption in the Royal Dockyards, 1688-1788’ in Kenneth Lunn and Ann Day (eds.), 
History of Work and Labour Relations in the Royal Dockyards (London: Mansell, 1999), pp. 1-2. This polarising 
tendency is also discernible among historians of the private, company docks who judged the labour practices of 
the English East India Company according to a sliding scale from benevolence to tyranny rather than on 
collaborative activities or the lobbying power of the labour force or viewed trading companies as catalysts for 
‘proletarianization’. See Margaret Makepeace, “Business and Benevolence: The East India Company’s 
Management of its London Warehouse Labourers, 1800-1858” (D.Phil., University of Leicester, 2007), p. 187 
see also Makepeace, The East India Company’s London Workers – Management of the Warehouse Labourers, 
1800-1858 (Boydell, 2010) and Jan Lucassen, “A Multinational and its Labor Force: The Dutch East India 
Company, 1595–1795”, International Labor and Working-Class History, 66 (2004), pp. 12–39, 33 respectively. 
23 Roger Morriss, ‘Government and Community: The changing context of labour relations, 1770-1830’ in Kenneth 
Lunn and Ann Day (eds.), History of Work and Labour Relations in the Royal Dockyards (London: Mansell, 
1999), p. 21. 
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This essay therefore offers a systematic and comprehensive study of the evidence the 
EIC’s dockyard provides social historians about the ways in which the corporate concentration 
of labour helped create an interest group both within and beyond the company’s formal 
membership. It offers a full account of the ways in which the EIC management channelled its 
traditional, corporate instincts into creating a pool of labour for the docks in what would 
become an early example of a ‘company town’ at adjoining Poplar.24 The essay analyses the 
social hierarchies at work within the docks and assesses when workers’ preferences were and 
were not influential for the company as well as the means that each group within the hierarchy 
used to sustain their own and the company’s ends. The essay also places the social and labour 
dynamics of the dockyard into the context of state employment at rival yards and into the 
broader context of the urban, corporate management of and support for local communities. A 
study of Blackwall as a crucible for early modern corporate labour relations offers an important 
insight into the ways in which corporations structured domestic labour disputes (and were 
indeed structured by them). It also offers recent debates about mercantilism some domestic 
focus to accompany a now-traditional focus on the transnational contexts for mercantilist 
thought.25 But most important, exploring the social history of the corporation helps to place the 
social history of labour back into the trading corporation’s early history in ways that may also 
compel more recent commentators on these much-misunderstood organisations to consider 
their intrinsically social roles and imperatives.26 Although the company’s employees did not 
always get their way with the company’s management, the Blackwall case suggests how – at 
times – trading corporations (like their livery and borough forbears) were not distant, 
impersonal institutions but social organisations, whose members invested time and energy on 
behalf of the ‘public’ community that the corporation represented.27 The essay begins by 
examining the rationales for building the dockyard at Blackwall and the relationship between 
their trade, state support and public opinion that was central to the company’s sustainability. It 
then narrates the yard’s rise and fall. The final section examines the organisational structure 
and culture of the yard to examine how the changing relationships between the labour force 
and the management of the company offer new insights about the history of the yard, the EIC, 




The decision to build a private dockyard at Blackwall was based on four assumptions. First, 
the East India trade required ships with specific features that could not be hired cheaply. Access 
                                                          
24 Blackwall and Poplar would therefore appear to be a very early example. For the more familiar later examples 
see: Jeremy Burchardt, Paradise Lost: Rural Idyll and Social Change Since 1800 (London, 2002). 
25 Nigel Worden, “Artisan Conflicts in a Colonial Context: The Cape Town Blacksmith Strike of 1752”, Labor 
History, 46 (2005), pp. 155-184.  
26 Oliver E. Williamson, The Economic Institutions of Capitalism, Firms, Markets, Relational Contracting 
(London, 1985), ch. 10; Paul DiMaggio (ed), The Twenty-First Century Firm: Changing Economic 
Organization in International Perspective (Princeton, 2001); and Colin Mayer, Firm Commitment: Why the 
Corporation is Failing Us (Oxford, 2013). 
27 Anne Goldgar and Robert L. Frost (eds.), Institutional Culture in Early Modern Society (Leiden: 2004); Steve 
Rappaport, Worlds Within Worlds: structures of life in sixteenth-century London (Cambridge: 1989); Phil 
Withington, The Politics of Commonwealth: citizens and freemen in early modern England (Cambridge: 2005). 
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to shipping was essential for the EIC and much of the company’s trade was undertaken in large, 
often specially made, vessels that were capable of the East Indian voyage, defending 
themselves from attack, and safely carrying goods on the long journey from one continent to 
another. The average tonnage of ships conducting trade in the Channel in this period was only 
50 to 100 tons, and those used for voyages to the West Indies, North America or Spain only 
reached around 200 tons at their largest.28 However, the EIC required larger vessels, with a 
tonnage between 300 and 700 tons deemed the most effective.29 For the first voyage east in 
1601 the company relied on purchasing ships, but these were soon found wanting.30 Building 
their own ships also allowed standardisation and ensured that ships would not be old, damaged 
or otherwise lacking the quality required.  
The second insight that informed the decision to build the Blackwall dockyard was 
financial. Building their own bespoke ships for the East would be cheaper than hiring them or 
chartering them from other shipwrights. In 1607 the company sought to charter ships that had 
been constructed bespoke for the trade, offering to pay £30 per ton. But with no offers the 
decision was made for the company to establish its own shipbuilding facilities.31 William 
Burrell, a ship builder who would become the long-standing expert in shipping for the 
Company, estimated that by building their own ships they could construct an 800-ton vessel 
for £4,000, a price he claimed was six times cheaper than that offered by other shipmakers.32 
It was also cheaper than buying ships from others, such as the £3,700 paid for the aged, 600-
ton Dragon that had been part of the first voyage.33  
Third, the EIC’s decision to build its own ships also helped the company impress its 
state backers. From its inception the company sought to ensure its access to the volume of 
shipping necessary for their trade, and the issue was included in their charter in 1600.34 The 
state’s price for granting monopoly privileges to the EIC was an understanding that the 
company would bolster the maritime strength of the nation. To ensure this, the company’s 
charter imposed restrictions on the use of ships by the company, allowing the employment of 
up to six ships and six pinnaces for their trade. It also regulated the scale of the company’s 
labour force and stipulated that the twelve permitted vessels be manned by a maximum of 500 
mariners.35 These numbers were tightly controlled and were offered on condition that if the 
Crown ‘have just cause to arm our navy in warlike manner in defence of our realm or for the 
offence of our enemies’ the ships of the EIC would not be allowed to depart on voyages east.36 
As such, the company’s docks and fleet would be an important symbol of national maritime 
dynamism and would be carefully watched by state officials. 
                                                          
28 Chaudhuri, English East India Company, p. 95. 
29 British Library [hereafter BL], IOR/B/5, 30th January 1615. 
30 Henry Stevens (ed), Dawn of British Trade to the East Indies: As Recorded in the Court Minutes of the East 
India Company, 1599-1603 (London, 1886), pp. 6, 8, 27, 92. 
31 BL, IOR/B/2, 19th May 1607. 
32 This seems an improbably good deal, but his estimates may have included the costs of other shipwrights 
including the cost of developing new, larger facilities capable of building these ships. BL, IOR/B/2, August 
1607. 
33 Stevens, Dawn of British Trade, p. 31. 
34 BL, IOR/A/2, ‘Charter for the East India Company, 1600’. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Ibid.  
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The crown’s concern regarding shipping was exacerbated by the comparative strength 
of its main rivals. In 1608, Noel de Caron – the Dutch ambassador to England - reported that 
the Dutch East India Company had access to forty-four powerful men-of-war, a navy that far 
outweighed the English company’s shipping at this point.37 De Caron also stated that this Dutch 
navy was ‘as strong and well established in the East Indies as the King of Spain’, suggesting 
that in spite of its significant investment in shipping the English company lagged behind their 
main European rivals in this respect.38 The purpose-built docks would help the English 
Company to make up some of this difference. Doing so would help to maintain the support of 
King James I. Such support was critical for the continuation of the Company’s privileges. In 
1609, around the time that the EIC’s charter was reaffirmed by James I, the King wrote to the 
Privy Council extolling the Company’s activities and explained how through the ‘continuance 
of their trade the greatest shipping of the realm is set a work, and much more great shipping 
built and is like to be than heretofore’.39  
Whereas the charter sought to limit the risk of losing ships and men to the East Indies, 
state subsidies offered generous inducements for naval construction and subsidies were offered 
that encouraged larger ships to be built. In 1616 the EIC received £736 10s in subsidy in return 
for building three ships.40 Two years later, in 1618, two ships were built and the company 
received a subsidy of £515 5s.41 Through these subsidies the Crown sought to encourage the 
Company’s shipbuilding without risking the defence of the realm. Larger ships could be more 
useful in times of war and enabled a greater volume of trade without breaking the demands to 
send no more than five per year to Asia. Over the next two decades, the Blackwall docks would 
form a central part of the company’s domestic and international reputation as a commercial 
and maritime power. Later in its history, the docks became an international symbol of the 
company’s commitment to trade that was deemed to be worth sustaining even after the financial 
benefits of the docks had declined. As one director put it when responding to calls to end work 
at the docks in the mid-1630s: ‘[it is] of considerable importance that work should not be 
stopped altogether in the yard, this having already occasioned much discourse, which doubtless 
will be carried into Holland and cause them to report to India that the company is dissolved.’42  
Fourth, the domestic employment that the EIC would provide at Blackwall made it 
easier for the company to depict its trade to a domestic audience as a positive social force. 
Criticised as a monopoly and an exporter of precious metal, the company turned its ambitions 
as a large employer into a central part of its public appeal. Sensitivity to the interests of the 
national labour force was amongst the company’s priorities from the beginning. Early written 
objections to the conduct of the company often expressed concern about the effects that its 
                                                          
37 Her Majesty’s Stationary Office, Calendar of the Cecil Papers in Hatfield House, volume 20 (London, 1968), 
pp. 70-96. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Her Majesty’s Stationary Office, Calendar of the Cecil Papers in Hatfield House, volume 21 (London, 1970), 
pp. 154-162. 
40 William Noel Sainsbury (ed), Calendar of State Papers, Colonial Series, East Indies, China and Japan, 1513-
1616 (London, 1864), p. 1142; Mary Anne Everett Green (ed), Calendar of State Papers Domestic, James I, 
volume 88 (London, 1858), pp. 378-389. 
41 William Noel Sainsbury (ed), Calendar of State Papers, Colonial Series, East Indies, China and Japan, 1513-
1616 (London, 1864), p. 382; Mary Anne Everett Green (ed), Calendar of State Papers Domestic, James I, 
volume 104 (London, 1858), pp. 599-614. 
42 BL, IOR/B/17, 4th May 1635. 
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dangerous, long-distance trade was having on the nation’s workforce. In 1615, Robert Kayl 
highlighted the huge loss of life of English labourers in the company’s flagship, the Trades 
Increase, and scoffed at their claims of employing the poor.43 In his response to this critique, 
company director, Dudley Digges rejected the assertion that the company depleted the nation’s 
labour force by describing how the company prevented the ‘Commonwealth’ from having to 
support for the ‘shipwrights, smiths, coopers, ropemakers, porters, lighter-men, &c. and such 
like infinite number of labourers which they have continually in pay’ at Blackwall yard, 
therefore saving money for the public purses and stimulating employment.44 By 1621, another 
EIC director, Thomas Mun, celebrated the importance of the company to shipbuilding by 
noting the social benefits of its employment at Blackwall.  
 
Do not their yearly buildings maintain many hundred poor people, and greatly increase the 
number of those artsmen which are so needful for this common wealth?45 
 
Mun proposed that the trade: 
 
will set to work five hundred men, carpenters, caulkers, carriers, joiners, smiths, & other 
laborers, 
 
Mun added that the company’s employment agenda at Blackwall was part of a broader social 
and charitable programme for the local community there: 
 
And likewise, are not many poor widows, wives and children of Blackwall, Limehouse, 
Ratcliffe, Shadwell, and Wapping, often relieved by the East India company with whole 
hogsheads of good beef and pork, biscuit and dolls of ready money? Are not divers of their 
children set on work to pick oakum, & other labours fitting their age and capacity?46 
 
The Blackwall employment and social project served to help the EIC present itself in a positive 
light both to the Crown and the public. By the early 1630s, the social conscience of the EIC 
appeared on the London stage in Mountford’s play ‘The Launching of the Mary’ which 
explained: 
 
'The East India gates stand open, open wide 
To entertain the needy and the poor'.  
'Blackwall proclaims their bounty: Limehouse  
  speaks 
(if not ingrate) their liberality. 
Ratcliffe cannot complain nor Wapping weep,  
Nor Shadwell cry against their niggardness. 
No, they do rather speak the contrary 
With acclamation to the highest heavens’47 
                                                          
43 [Robert Kayl], The Trades Increase (London, 1615), p. 31. 
44 Dudley Digges, A Discourse on Trade (London, 1615), p. 41. 
45 [Thomas Mun], A Discourse of Trade, From England vnto the East-Indies: Answering to Diuerse Obiections 
Which are Vsually Made Against the Same (London, 1621), pp. 30, 41/42, 43. 
46 See also McCormick ‘Population’, p. 29 







Despite a clear rationale for the construction of their private dockyard at Blackwall, the, 
building, maintenance and staffing of the yard proved challenging for the EIC. Requiring 
significant investment, these challenges were a major theme for discussion in the company’s 
Court Minutes.48 For example, during the earliest plans for the dockyard the validity of an 
extensive dockyard complex was questioned, and the company initially chose to build only a 
single large ship.49 Another ongoing concern was the possibility that the EIC’s charter would 
not be renewed, or might be invalidated by Parliament, a situation that would have lost the 
company a lot of money in what needed to be a long-term investment to be viable. In 1614 for 
example, the Court of Committees discussed the purchase of land in Blackwall for docks but 
were forced to concede that it was too much of a risk.50 From their earliest development the 
docks were expected to save the company money, but the upfront cost was significant. They 
were not an asset that could be cut from the balance sheet with ease if they no longer served 
their purpose so the risks were significant.  
Aside from costs and political uncertainty, the labour force provided a further 
challenge. The company needed to assemble a vast and skilled labour force capable of building 
large and state-of-the-art vessels. But they had to do so without diverting workers away from 
the naval yards and without exposing themselves to the labour power of other corporations like 
the Company of Shipwrights of London.51 Locating the yard at some distance from London 
also posed organisational questions, because the workforce and managers would need to travel 
from London or be supplied from the local population who operated outside the familiar labour 
market of the City.  
In spite of these challenges Blackwall expanded rapidly throughout the later 1610s and 
1620s. The company purchased more land around the docks in 1619 and again in 1621, when 
an area in the East March of Poplar was purchased at 5s per acre.52 Despite worsening 
commercial conditions for the company during the mid-1620s, it continued to expand its 
operation at Blackwall.53 When news emerged of land becoming available around the 
Blackwall facility in 1624 the company was quick in agreeing to purchase the land to enlarge 
the facility further.54 Expanding the facilities and careful management of the docks enabled the 
construction of over seventy ships between 1600 and 1640.55 Not only does this demonstrate 
the scale of the EIC’s ship building activities during this period but also that they were 
                                                          
48 These were minutes from meetings between the Court of Committees (the company’s managing body) and the 
General Court meetings (where all members of the EIC could attend) and are the main source for exploring the 
inner workings of the organisation. Accounts for the period do not survive. While we have used all available 
evidence relating to the Company’s activities at Blackwall during this period, there is much that the records do 
not show. 
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54 BL, IOR/B/9, 6th November 1624. 
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operating on an entirely different scale from most ship builders in England where ships of more 




Through their investment in ship building infrastructure the EIC gained a reputation for 
proficiency in constructing the specialist ships required for long-distance trade.57 The 
reputation of the company’s shipbuilding prowess was not limited to England and in 1624 the 
King of Denmark sought to use their expertise during plans to launch his own trading voyage 
to Asia. On 8 September 1624, EIC director Thomas Stile reported the Danish King’s request 
for the company to send carpenters capable of building these ships to Denmark. The company 
refused, deciding that they only had one man capable of managing the work and that he was 
required for their own needs.58 However, a few weeks later the Court of Committees agreed to 
allow the King of Denmark to use their facilities for the construction of his ship.59 This deal 
demonstrates the international reputation for excellence that the Blackwall yard had achieved. 
In spite of an increasingly challenging trading landscape that dogged the EIC into the 
early 1630s, numerous members were still offering their encouragement to expand the yard 
further, but they were becoming more of a minority.60 The rising cost of labour appears to have 
been a key feature in the decision to close the yard. From 1625 labourer’s and craftsmen’s 
wages had been increasing sharply and were 50% higher by the end of the 1640s.61 From this 
point onwards the docks entered a period of slow decline as the company sought to cut costs 
and improve the efficiency of their global operations. In 1635, alongside attempts to reduce the 
expense of Blackwall, the company considered the possibility of selling the yard or buildings 
attached to it – the dock’s inventory alone was valued at over £10,000.62 From the 1640s, while 
the docks were still held by the EIC, their use was increasingly opened up to other parties.63 
By 1644 the condemnation of the docks as wasteful was increasingly common. The EIC’s 
treasurer, John Massingberd, reviewed the company’s accounts and concluded that ‘their stock 
being but small, it were very fitting some way should be thought upon to lessen the Company’s 
charge […] particularly in the express expenditure of money weekly at Blackwall.’ For the first 
time however, Massingberd wasn’t advocating for money saving strategies, but instead 
encouraged the company directors that the docks ‘were best to be sold and the money put into 
cash, and that for providing of shipping they might better freight then build’.64 Although the 
company decided that they ‘cannot be without their yard at Blackwall’ simply for quick cash 
returns, they did agree that if it was demonstrated that ‘freighting of ships was cheaper to the 
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58 BL, IOR/B/9, September 8, 1624. 
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company than setting out ships of their own’ then closing the docks would be an option. As 
this option was explored, it remained unclear whether freighting ships would be cheaper, but 
‘in respect of lessening the company’s charges divers opinions were delivered, some 
conceiving it necessary to desert Blackwall, others not: some holding it fittest to freight ships, 
others thinking it better to build.’65 While the docks at Blackwall had lost some of their allure, 
even in the later 1640s they retained support among the directors of the company – at least 
enough to keep them operational for a few years longer. By 1652, however, the company sold 
the docks and their role in the history of London and the Thames would pass into a new stage.66 
   
*** 
 
Why did the EIC turn its back on its Blackwall dockyard? Clearly, the relationship between the 
company and their docks was more complex than a simple question of costs. Indeed, the 
realisation that the company kept the docks going after they ceased to be cost-effective begs an 
alternative question: why did they sustain the yard for as long as they did? Although sections 
of the company wished to prioritise the non-financial benefits of the dock, rising costs meant 
that these benefits became harder to realise. In 1641 Sir Nicholas Crispe questioned the great 
costs of the yard, suggesting that they ‘should be lessened’ and that the company should have 
nothing to do with Blackwall so that it would ‘not to look after magnificence, but profit’.67 A 
less buoyant commercial and far less stable political context in the 1630s and 40s also made 
large-scale infrastructure within England more difficult to justify.  
The rest of the essay examines the significance of this large-scale labour force in the 
history of the dockyard project and of the company itself during this formative period in its 
history. It assesses how its employees appeared to become a powerful constituency within the 
EIC that the Court of Committees could not simply dismiss as a resource to be managed. 
Careful examination of the role of the labour force in determining the future of the dockyard at 
Blackwall also reveals the extent to which the company sought to gather, structure, cultivate, 
and supports its workforce at Poplar. This kind of community building – for so long a core 
activity of corporations in England – appears to have represented part of a long-term solution 
to its problem of labour supply that was both traditional for domestic corporations and 
pioneering for joint stocks. The EIC appeared to prioritise community building as a means of 
improving workers’ loyalty, ensuring social stability and facilitating effective management at 
the docks. 
The EIC was responsible for the control of a considerable workforce at Blackwall. 
Numbering in the hundreds, these workers ranged from skilled carpenters to unskilled labourers 
and their skills and effort were essential for the effective operation of the docks.68 The company 
deployed a range of methods to manage their workers. At times, it proposed to manage a clear 
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hierarchy from the Court of Committees to the labourer, but it also employed officers whose 
job it was to mediate between the Court of Committees and the employee in an arrangement 
that contested this hierarchy. The company proved – at times - responsive to formal petitions 
from both organised groups and individuals. But its most compelling, long-term labour 
management strategy involved investing in the fabric of the community around the docks itself, 
the growing hamlet of Poplar.69 
The most detailed account of the EIC’s management structure can be found in the 1621 
The Lawes or Standing Orders of the East India Company, which detailed the requirements of 
different roles within the company and codified its expectations of their employees.70 These 
bye-laws were not meant to be prescriptive, but rather a guide to how the internal governance 
of the company should operate. The Court of Committees took a strong interest in the docks, 
and at least one director was appointed at all times to oversee operations at Blackwall. He was 
responsible for reporting to other directors about the docks, but also acted as an important 
conduit between the senior staff at the docks and the leadership of the company. Through the 
oversight of a director the company could more effectively manage their substantial workforce. 
For example, when the director responsible for Blackwall reported to the company in 1624 that 
a recently constructed alehouse in Blackwall was damaging productivity, the dockyard official, 
Mr Fotherby, was quickly instructed to restrict access to the ‘tap house there in the yard at other 
times then at their meals to the hindrance of their day labour.’71 The presence of the director 
enabled the quick reporting and rapid response necessary for managing the working routines 
at the yard. Each year the Court of Committees held a meeting at Blackwall as part of a gesture 
confirming their oversight over the yard and expressing the site’s importance to the company.
 Alongside directors who oversaw the docks, the company was also regularly appraised 
through the Purser General, who received funds directly from the company treasurers each 
week and oversaw the payment of wages at the dockyard. He also undertook the accounting 
for Blackwall and was responsible to ‘certify by him the particulars under their hands to the 
Treasurer in a book for that purpose.72 Like the director responsible for Blackwall, the Purser 
General helped ensure a clear line of communication between the dockyard and the Court of 
Committees and enabled a fairly clear understanding of the day-to-day operation of the docks 
at the highest levels within the company. Another important figure in the company was the 
Ships Husband, who managed the outfitting of ships and updated the Court of Committees, 
which he attended regularly, on all matters regarding the company’s fleet.73 There was, then, 
clear line-of-communication between the company’s corporate headquarters in the City of 
London and the Blackwall dockyard.74 
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At the dockyard, the Clark of the Yard, Porter of the Lodge and Chirurgeon General 
each took responsibility for overseeing the workforce. In part, the role of these figures was to 
assist the management of the docks, but more importantly each of these individuals were also 
given the authority to assess the suitability of workers - physically but also morally. The Clark 
was responsible for monitoring ‘abuses in the yards’ that ranged from ensuring ‘that no 
disorders be used in the said tap house by drawing of strong beer’ and that they did not ‘suffer 
more labourers to be at the carrying of a piece of timber or plank then are needful.’75 The Porter 
took this monitoring a step further and had special privileges ‘upon just suspicion’ to stop and 
search workers that might be stealing iron or other materials from the yard. His role, then, was 
not just to ensure the productivity of the workforce, but to monitor for criminal activity.76 
Finally, the Chirurgeon assessed workers’ suitability for work. This included establishing 
whether they were decrepit or lame, but also whether they were ‘unclean’ or had not attended 
their haircut, which was required every forty days.77 In addition to instructions regarding their 
work, labourers’ orders included the demand that ‘they shall not commit or doe any riot, by 
fighting, swearing, breaking of pots’.78 Part of the company’s concern in this regard was that 
the reputation of the company was at risk and would be damaged if social stability was 
threatened by their employees, but there were also deep concerns that company employees 
were a risk due to their access to expensive materials that could be stolen. The company 
demanded that its employees were not only capable of hard work, but were also careful to try 
and ensure their workers were good, moral ‘citizens’ of the company who could represent the 
EIC in public and in the workspace. The managerial powers of these senior officers at the yard 
helped to achieve these goals. 
These managers were not solely preoccupied with reporting fraud and indiscipline to 
the Court of Committees. As intermediaries between the Court of Committees and the 
workforce, these officials of the yard were essential for good labour relations. Workers could 
lobby the company with – at times - some success through their representatives. The chief 
carpenter was particularly important, and it was this individual who was usually called on by 
the company to explain issues relating to production at the docks and to represent the 
preferences of his highly skilled workforce to the Court of Committees. At a meeting of the 
directors in July 1621, the carpenter reported that employees resented being searched by 
company officials who feared that the labour force may be stealing valuable materials. Noting 
a bargaining opportunity for his staff, he added that the previous year he had been forced to 
hire men from outside London to undertake the work. He argued that the company should 
refrain from searching senior employees if they wished to retain good local staff. The Court of 
Committees reassured him, and instructed that senior employees be told, that the searches were 
not undertaken because they were suspected, and hoped that ‘none should be offended’. They 
agreed however that searching would be stopped for a time except in situations where there 
was a particular cause for suspicion.79 This example perhaps suggests that representatives of 
the skilled and loyal workers could at times lobby the management of the company to uphold 
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their interests. In the 1620s at least, the employees of the company were able – on occasion - 
to leverage the skills they developed through building the unique ships the EIC required, to 
improve their working conditions. 
These officers also often represented the workforce and the EIC itself to other potential 
employees – often powerful ones. For much of the 1620s and 1630s, the chief carpenter at 
Blackwall wielded considerable influence within the shipbuilding community as a whole. 
Although understood to represent the skilled workers, the chief carpenter did not always force 
the company to accede to workers’ interpretations of events, however. In 1624 when a delay in 
the production of ships was reported, the Court of Committees called on the carpenter, Mr 
Stephens, to explain why.80 Stephens placed the blame for the slowdown away from the 
workers informing the Court that ‘the work was begun late’, ‘the sickness that reigned 
everywhere has also seized upon his workmen’, and that the King had ordered the company’s 
carpenters to work on naval vessels.81 Unwilling to accept these delays, the Court immediately 
ordered ‘that if about London there cannot be found workmen to serve the turn, they must be 
hired elsewhere’ and also appointed a number of directors to go to the yard each week to ensure 
the construction of their ships continued uninterrupted.82 They also requested that access to the 
yard’s tap house by more carefully managed.83 So workers and employers formed contrasting 
explanations for the slow down with workers blaming external factors and the Court of 
Committees blaming the workers’ thirst for alcohol. The control that the Court placed over 
representatives of skilled workers appears to have meant that the carpenters – at times - placed 
the interests of the company over the interests of the state. In 1635, the head shipwright of the 
company appears to have been more resistant to state requests and was accused of ignoring the 
Crown’s order to send shipwrights to the royal dockyard at Chatham to conduct an inspection 
of hulls. He had instead prioritised that all shipwrights were present for shipwright company 
elections scheduled for the same day.84 By the 1630s, then, the EIC had achieved greater control 
over the Shipwrights lobby than the state.  
The EIC’s management structure was designed to encourage the accountability of 
senior officers to their juniors. Officers were subject to the scrutiny of their staff before the 
Court of Committees. Workmen were encouraged to ‘make complaint unto the Governor, 
Deputy and Committees, of all disorders, which they shall perceive or know to be performed 
in the Yard by any man, or of oppressions or wrongs which might be offered them, by any of 
the company’s chief officers’.85 Part of this statute was for workers to monitor their co-workers, 
but there was also a clear expectation and willingness for the company to receive complaints 
about senior officers within the company. When receiving complaints of this sort the company 
promised to seek that ‘such courses may be presently taken for remedies’.86 For instance, in 
1643, Lucy Bearblocke and Margaret Coates petitioned the Company regarding a property 
purchased by their mother within in yard used ‘for making of spun yard and twice-laid ropes’ 
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which was under threat by other employee, Boatswain Ingram, who sought to expand his own 
properties within the yard and force them from the site. The Company sided with Bearblocke 
and Coates, declaring the property would ‘remain to them as formerly’ on condition that it was 
fully repaired and they continued to make ropes and yarn for the Company.87 Even though in 
opposition to a more senior figure, Ingram, these two sisters were able to obtain a position 
response from the Company. The company sought to encourage a working environment where 
people in positions of authority were accountable to their employees just as much as they 
created a system whereby these same employees could be controlled and monitored.  
The EIC was – at times - responsive to formal petitions and appeals from its workers. 
Relationships between the early modern trading corporation and employees were, therefore, 
affected by activities that went beyond the simple control of workers through rules and 
regulations. From its earliest meetings, the EIC was willing to receive, and often support, 
petitions from employees. Through petitions the company was able to offer welfare and poor 
relief. The motivations for these activities were wide ranging, including the civic humanist and 
religious imperatives of the company’s leaders who wished to ensure that the corporation 
sustained a reputation for good works. But these activities also helped to promote good 
relations with their workers. The EIC was not alone in its attempts to offer support of this kind 
to employees. The state also received similar petitions for support from workers at its docks in 
Woolwich.88 However, the rare examples of petitions to the crown, or other trading 
corporations, were far less common than those received by the EIC. Between July 1624 and 
June 1625, the company received 166 petitions covering a range of topics – eighty-six of these 
related to payments and wages and nineteen directly requested charitable relief for employees 
or their families.89 On the other hand, the Levant Company didn’t receive a single request for 
aid during the same period.90 This combination of strict rules and regulations with responsive 
management was not, of course, unique to the Company, and other organisation would long 
maintain similar structures to ensure discipline.91 However, in the case of the EIC this approach 
was more than simply controlling employees and connects this innovative joint-stock 
enterprise with its preceding social-corporate organisations and demonstrates how we can do 
more to reflect on the company’s relationship to its employees to develop a better 
understanding of the social history of this emerging ‘company-state’.92  
The company often responded to appeals from individuals for redress of specific 
grievances. In 1624 the Company received a petition from the Clerk of General Stores at 
Blackwall, Robert Fotherby, asking for a raise in wages due to an increased workload without 
any additional assistance. The company considered his past service, decided that he was a 
valuable asset and doubled his salary.93 In 1635, when Richard Limney petitioned to be 
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admitted to the company’s Almshouse at Blackwall (which had been established in 1627 
through an endowment provided in the will of a company member for the use of disabled 
seamen, their widows, and orphans) the company was ‘pleased to admit him’, in part due to 
their understanding that he was ‘a poor aged seaman that went out with Captain Drake in 1601 
and afterwards went in the Hector for the Indies.’94 Similarly, in the same year, when Nash, 
the waterman at Blackwall, sought aid after ‘his boat in this last frost was split and utterly 
spoiled in the service of the Company’ the company was ‘pleased to bestow upon him £3 for 
the building of another boat.’95 Through these activities the workers could share their 
grievances with the company and it in turn could contribute in a number of different ways to 
the lives and the communities of their employees at Blackwall.  
Petitions also came to the EIC from organised groups. These lobbies reflected the 
corporatist culture of the City of London and their pleadings proved to be of broader 
significance for the company. As shipbuilding became more important to London’s economy 
with the expansion of overseas trade in the early years of the seventeenth century, so existing 
shipwrights began to organise. In 1613 a warrant for the incorporation of the Company of 
Shipwrights had been issued for the ‘avoiding of many abuses and deceits formally used in the 
building of ships.’96 Senior shipbuilders complained of the limited control they had over their 
apprentices. They sought to standardise the trade and limit the power apprentices could wield 
during disputes. But the employment opportunities presented by the EIC’s new dockyard at 
Blackwall appears to have encouraged less-established workers to organise to challenge the 
supremacy of entrenched labour groups. In 1618 the company received a petition from ‘poor 
men of Blackwall, Radcliffe and Limehouse’ who sought work in the expanding docks but had 
been unable to do so ‘because the porters of London do appose’ them. The EIC took advantage 
of this supportive local labour force and decided that the authority of the porters to restrict 
workers in the City of London did not apply to Blackwall. The company proclaimed that they 
could employ any workers that they thought fit.97 The emergence of a labour force at Blackwall 
therefore facilitated new alliances between the company and emergent, unskilled workers. 
These alliances depended upon the formation of organised labour groups and the submission 
of petitions to the company, which it could then take advantage of when recruiting and retaining 
its workforce. 
But such labour groups could seek to challenge the company as often as work with it. 
At Blackwall the EIC experienced a number of disputes with groups of labourers who sought 
to influence the company’s decisions. These often emerged from workers who did not identify 
with the company’s emergent labour force at Blackwall and Poplar. In 1618 a petition was 
received from twenty-five salters employed at the dockyard ‘desiring some augmentation to 
their wages in regard of their extraordinary pains taken by reason of their dwelling in London 
and work at Blackwall.’98 They argued that they worked longer hours than they were paid for 
once consideration of their longer commute was taken into account. This request caused 
considerable debate among the directors of the company, some arguing that the additional 
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efforts of the salters made them worthy of consideration, while others claimed that it was a 
mistake to hire such men and that it would be preferable to employ men who lived in Blackwall. 
Finally, the decision was made to allow the continued employment of salters who would work 
for their previous wages, and for those that would not ‘mariners shall be appointed in their 
works’ instead.99 In this case the salters were unable to make demands of the EIC as their skills 
were not understood to be prized. The company’s belief that they could replace the salters 
easily limited their bargaining position. The minute books suggest that the company hoped to 
nurture a loyal and local workforce closer to the dockyard. 
Highly skilled workers – especially carpenters – whose work was in demand by the 
company and the state proved more effective at wielding influence when negotiating with their 
employers. In the mid-1620s, the demand for carpenters was so great that the Crown would 
seek to appropriate the EIC’s carpenters or even send their representatives to press carpenters 
into naval service.100 Carpenters could wield considerable power by grouping together to 
demand better conditions. The company was keenly aware of this possibility and noted a 
tendency for larger workforces to grow unruly after receiving reports that ‘the carpenters of the 
King’s yard at Deptford and the company’s yard grew to a tumultuous head’ in 1619.101 It was 
reported that 200 to 300 carpenters had left their work, ‘violently taking and carrying certain 
apprentices out of the EIC’s yard at Deptford and Blackwall with a drum stroke up before 
them.’102 It was suspected that the riot had been caused by fears that the new Company of 
Shipwrights would bring about a decline in carpenters’ wages, but the EIC’s representative at 
Blackwall, Mr Burrell ‘denied it, affirming that there is no sure matter but that the cause of this 
tumult.’103 Instead, Burrell suggested that it was caused by the cessation of the carpenters’ 
‘former liberty of making and carrying away chips [discarded pieces of wood], of having daily 
wage not and day drinking time and the like.’104 Burrell also suggested that the corporation, 
the Company of Shipwrights, was ‘the only cause of keeping all the carpenters in order, who 
would otherwise exact what wage they pleased […] yet it is found that the carpenters wage at 
both the company’s yards are very reasonable.’105 With this in mind, Burrell acquired the 
assistance of a Justice of the Peace ‘to cause some of the heads of this mutiny to be arrested 
and punished.’106 However, while carpenters at the King’s yard were imprisoned the EIC took 
a softer line than that proposed by Burrell. The company negotiated a cessation of hostilities 
with their own carpenters, and the Governor spoke to ‘the chief of the mutineers and bound 
them to their good behaviour.’107 Through this personal communication between employer and 
employee the company was able to manage their workers effectively, and only ten days after 
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the start of the dispute the Governor was confident to express that ‘the mutiny is pacified’ and 
all ‘will be well hereafter.’108 The carpenters’ ire had been raised by threats to their working 
lives, either through declining wages or threats to their traditional liberties, but the company 
was able to negotiate in good faith and reassure them that their livelihoods were not under 
threat.109 This episode perhaps suggests how important building positive relationships with 
their employees could be for the company, and why they took such care to undertake socially 
responsible activities and work with the wider community in Blackwall and Poplar. Through 
these activities the company bolstered its position when negotiating with groups that might 
otherwise have claimed greater support from a wider group of workers or been less willing to 
negotiate in good faith with the company following disputes.  
This proved to be an enduring tradition as the company responded – from time to time 
- positively to appeals from organised groups. Working in the docks was dangerous, and 
protecting workers injured while employed by the company upheld the company’s 
responsibilities to its labour force. Two petitions received in December 1631 ‘under the hand 
of divers of the better sort of the company’s workmen and officers, as well sea and landsmen, 
namely shipwrights, caulkers, joiners, sawyers, labourers and men of all sorts in pay’ requested 
the attention of a surgeon for employees injured in the company’s service.110 The company 
deemed ‘the request to be reasonable’ and ‘ordered that Mr Woodall or some surgeon by his 
appointment should from time to time attend this service and take care of them accordingly.’111 
This provision was valid for men ‘abroad every of the company’s ships in harbour, as also in 
or near their works in Blackwall yard.’112 By supporting the petition the company suggested to 
their employees that they were not only willing to respond to suitable demands for support, but 
that employees themselves could influence the way the company supported them. This respect 
for the labour force continued, and as the costs of the dockyard became more difficult to bear 
in the mid-1630s it was communicated in the ways that the company prioritised labour over 
the management when it came to cost cutting and wage decreases.113 In 1635 the Treasurer 
argued that the docks ‘doth daily exhaust their treasure in a very great proportion’, but he 
proposed to target the wages of servants rather than workers: ‘there are divers of the servants 
both there and elsewhere which in his opinion may well be spared and the company freed of 
that charge’.114 The directors ‘took into consideration their officers and servants with their 
salaries as well at the East India House as at Blackwall’.115 Most of senior officers at Blackwall 
had their wages reduced by between 30% and 40% but the wages of workers were left 
untouched.116  
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While the company responded positively to many petitions, there were occasions when 
support for petitioners was not forthcoming. Naturally, as the profitability of the EIC declined 
so too did its responsiveness to the pleadings of its employees. In one case, in 1642, the 
company received a petition from ‘the watermen and others of the hamlet of Poplar and 
Blackwall wherein they desired that the Court would be pleased to bestow somewhat on them 
towards the repair of the bridge from the waterside near the company’s yard at Blackwall’.117 
However, the company discussed the proposal and concluded that ‘the company have no reason 
to repair the same for … they never or very seldom make use thereof having a wharf of their 
own to land their goods at’ and refused to assist the petitioners.118 This episode perhaps 
suggests that the company’s approach to their workers, and their local communities, welfare 
and social demands was constrained by a range of questions including access to funds and 
conflicting social priorities.  
Alongside this increasing tendency to refuse employees’ requests for support, the 
company also began to question its support for traditional labour rights. What in May 1619 a 
company official at Blackwall would term the ‘liberty of making and carrying away chips’ 
would, in 1643 be called by the Court of Committees ‘the embezzling away of timber old or 
new or the cutting of timber into chips which may be fit for other services’ that would then be 
taken from the yard to be used, or sold to, inhabitants of the area around the docks.’119 As the 
company sought to curtail its employees’ traditional privilege of using these chips as a bonus, 
the directors received a petition from the ‘carpenters that work in Blackwall yard’ that 
requested they ‘may not be denied the privilege of their predecessors and themselves in 
carrying forth chips out of the company’s yard’.120 On receiving the petition: 
 
The Court called all the petitioners in being about fifteen in number, and told 
them that they had not only been informed, but some of them had been eye 
witnesses of the great abuse committed in this kind (not that the petitioners or 
any of them were charged in their particulars) and therefore the Court was 
resolved to continue the former resolution not to give any that work there any 
chips and if they would willingly and cheerfully work for their days wages they 
should be weekly paid as they are want to be and continued in the company’s 
work as long as the company had occasion to employ them, but if now they 
refused to work upon these terms then they were resolved to deny those that 
refuse to work now, if hereafter they shall proffer their service.121 
 
The company therefore perhaps found itself, in the 1640s, that forced them to refuse the petition 
of their employees even if it meant deviating from the provision of a long-held privilege. While 
the expansion of the royal dockyard at Chatham and the increased demand for skilled 
carpenters that it produced had been enough to allow the carpenters to prevent search by 
company officials in the 1620s, the drastically worsened commercial and political 
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circumstances of the 1640s prevented the company from having to honour the worker privilege 
of retaining chips.  
Throughout the history of its operation at Blackwall, however, the EIC demonstrated a 
persistent interest in developing the social fabric of its prime recruitment space adjacent to the 
Blackwall docks – Poplar. As we have seen, the company prioritised the local labour force for 
tactical reasons as the dockyard was built to ensure that it could attract and retain workers 
without having to intercede with established and organised labour forces. Across the 1630s and 
1640s, when the company’s responsiveness to special pleading from its skilled workforce 
declined, it continued to spontaneously support the broader interests of the local community to 
shore up workers’ support at Blackwall. In 1631 ‘it was ordered that the assessment for the 
relief of the poor for the company’s yard at Blackwall’ would be paid by the company. This 
meant that the company offered to finance poor relief in the vicinity of the docks. The company 
also ordered that ‘a great bible shall be bought by Robert Fotherby for the use of the Almsmen 
at Blackwall’.122 Similarly, in 1633 the company believed there was a ‘great desire of the 
inhabitants of Blackwall to have the company build a chapel in their hospital in Poplar’.123 The 
directors considered this a very good work, but it was ‘conceived more proper and fit to endow 
the hospital with a competency of lands to maintain the poor before they expend more money 
in building’.124 To achieve this, they decided ‘first to raise a stock for the buying of lands’ and 
sought to use a small proportion of profits from the next returning voyage to purchase land 
worth ‘£60 or 100 marks per annum’ to support the hospital.125 Not only does this episode 
again demonstrate the EIC’s willingness to invest in social activities to improve local support, 
but also that they were confident that their investors would be willing to contribute a small 
share of their own dividends to achieve the same. Along with the foundation of the company’s 
Almshouse at Poplar in 1627, the company assumption of these basic social and religious roles 
within the community of its workforce represented a change of tactic. Rather than heed the 
narrow requests and preferences of interested lobbies, the company began in the late 1620s and 
30s to nurture a more traditional corporate profile as the supporter of the welfare and spiritual 
needs of the community at large. 
This alteration in approach can be witnessed in the company’s new policy on the 
provision of chips from the yard in the 1640s. Although the carpenters failed to retain their 
traditional right to the chips, the company instead proposed to promote a broader constituency. 
While the Court of Committees forced the carpenters into accepting that they enjoyed no rights 
to receive the chips from the yard, the company ordered that ‘the poorest sort of the hamlet of 
Poplar and Blackwall may especially be relieved with them’ during gathering days ‘every 
month or twenty days’.126 On these days ‘care be taken that none come into the yard to gather 
chips but the poor of the said hamlet, and the wives and servants of such men as are employed 
in the yard or in the East Indies’.127 The directors were clear that ‘the intent of the company 
that what chips are not expended in the yard by the pitch kettles, salting house and dwelling 
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houses may be shared indifferently amongst the workmen and poor of the said hamlet.’128 As 
this suggests, the company sought to ensure that their policy to reduce the theft of chips – which 
was strengthened by new powers extended to the porter at the same time – would not damage 
their relationship with their largest constituents, namely their employees and the communities 
on which they depended for labour. The company prioritised the community of labour over 
particular labour lobbies. They proposed to favour the indigent over the industrious. Such a 
move would clearly block any attempt by the representatives of their labour force to allege that 




The EIC’s sale of the Blackwall dockyard in 1652 did not sever its ties with the community of 
Blackwall and Poplar that it had helped to create. In 1652, the EIC director, Maurice 
Thompson, provided the first £100 for the building of the company’s Poplar Chapel. The 
church would be completed two years later. Although the majority of its parishioners were no 
longer direct employees of the company (though it is likely many still owed their livelihood’s 
the company as employees of suppliers of the Company), the community was in no doubt about 
who their social patron was. The company had provided large numbers of skilled jobs in the 
area for almost forty years. Its decision to build the Blackwall dockyard was not altruistic, 
however. Cheaper ships, built to exacting company specifications were – in the buoyant 
commercial settings of the 1610s and 20s - built in large quantities. The yard became the toast 
of the company and the kingdom and became a crucial expression of the company’s reputation 
around the world. As an employer, the yard enabled the company to deflect constant 
accusations that its monopoly and trade depleted the nation’s human and environmental 
resources. Instead, the labour force at the docks was a source of constant pride to the company 
and helped the company to justify its privileges with reference to the scale of its workforce and 
the opportunities its trade provided to nurture and protect communities where it operated.  
This social history of the Blackwall dockyard’s labour force has shown how the 
company was not an exclusively command and control employer. Although it thought carefully 
about its organisational structure and could and did manage its large-scale workforce 
effectively it operated a managerial culture that often welcomed and sometimes depended upon 
the input of the labour force. The relationship between the company and its employees 
depended on willing negotiation, effective communication, and trust. The EIC stuck doggedly 
to upholding the interests of its labour force long after the business case had ceased. Even as 
the financial benefits of the dockyard declined, the company continued to operate in ways that 
corporate bodies had been doing in London and other major commercial towns in England and 
throughout Europe for centuries - financing welfare and social provisions for their 
communities. The EIC was therefore an employer who proved responsive to and responsible 
for its labour force – in ways that historians of trading corporations have - on the whole – not 
acknowledged.129 
                                                          
128 Ibid. 
129 The important exception is Makepeace 
22 
 
In 1657, the EIC would shift its infrastructural ambitions far from Poplar. A new 
‘plenipotentiary’ charter created a permanent joint stock for the company. It also allowed the 
company to build fortifications and facilitated a new phase in the history of the company’s 
expansion in Asia. But the company did not forget about the community it had built in 
Blackwall and Poplar. In the same year, the company formally took responsibility for Poplar 
Chapel, because the people of the parish could not afford the upkeep. The company would 















Table 1: Size of EIC ships built at their docks.130 
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